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to procedures approved by a Report Reveiw Committee consisting of members of 
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Institute of Medicine. 
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research, dedicated to the furtherance of science and technology and to their 
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The Honorable Frank C. Carlucci 
The Honorable William R. Graham 
The Honorable James C. Miller, I11 
Executive Office of the President 
The White House 
Washington, D.C. 20500 
The Honorable James C. Fletcher 
National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
Washington, D.C. 20546 
RE: Final Report of the National Research Council Committee on Space Station 
Gentlemen: 
The final report of the Committee on Space Station is enclosed. This 
report reflects the unanimous views of the Committee members. They have asked 
me to emphasize the subjects discussed in subsequent paragraphs of this letter. 
The Space Station Program will be the most ambitious space project the 
nation has ever undertaken. It will require tens of billions of dollars over a 
period of several decades and will absorb much of the energy of NASA for most 
of that period. It will entwine for many years our space program with those of 
our international partners, and i t  will be a highly visible symbol of the 
American commitment to remain a leader among spacefaring nations. 
Thus the Space Station Program must have enduring stable support across 
administrations, and this support must be generous enough to provide adequate 
hardware and testing, provisions to ensure that i t  can be operated safely for 
decades, and an adequate space transportation system for its deployment, 
assembly and operation. 
The space transportation system has been a major concern of this 
Committee. The current Space Shuttle is barely adequate for the limited 
purpose of deploying the Space Station, and i t  is inadequate to meet broader 
national needs in space. The Committee recommends in the strongest terms that 
the Shuttle be upgraded with new improved solid rocket motors, that it be 
supplemented with expendable launch vehicles, and that a heavy lift launch 
vehicle be developed for use in the latter half of the 1990s. 
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The Committee wishes to commend NASA for a number of constructive changes 
it has made in the Space Station Program during the short course of this 
study. The study has probably accelerated a process that was and is even now 
underway. However, it is important to understand that the continuing changes 
in many parts of the Program reduce the reliability of current cost estimates. 
The Committee believes that the net effects on costs of these dynamics will be 
upward. Thus the Committee strongly recommends that NASA prepare a new Space 
Station Program cost estimate in conjunction with the Program Requirements 
Review scheduled for  early next year. This exercise should address the full 
range of uncertainties in the. current Program, some of which are discussed in 
this report. 
The Committee's findings and recommendations are more fully summarized in 
Section 2 of the final report. 
We would like to thank NASA for its cooperation and support in the conduct 
of this study. Many demands were placed on NASA personnel, and the Committee 
appreciates their efforts. 
Sincerely, 
Y Robert C. Seamans 
Chairman 
Committee on the Space Station 
National Research Council 
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PREFACE 
In January of 1984, during his State of the Union address, the President of 
the United States directed the National Aeronautics and Space Administration to 
develop a Space Station within a decade. The Station was to be permanently 
manned, and international participation was invited. The NASA estimate for the 
Space Station for the Fiscal Year 1985 budget was $8.0 billion total costs in 
1984 dollars. 
Earlier, in May of 1982, NASA Administrator James M. Beggs established a 
Space Station Task Force that spent almost two years defining the preliminary 
requirements and developing conceptual architectures. The Concept Development 
Group of the Task Force produced a "planar" configuration that served as the 
starting point for the "power tower," the reference configuration used in 
subsequent Phase B studies by industry. (The Concept Development exercise 
consisted of a coordinated 12-month study by 12 contractors and all NASA 
centers.) Starting in 1983, NASA also conducted a number of Space Station user 
workshops and in April of 1984 the Task Force on the Scientific Uses of the 
Space Station was created to coordinate input from the U.S. scientific 
community. The user working groups and the Task Force on Scientific Uses 
influenced Phase B requirements in such areas as cabin pressure, module 
location, and truss structure. 
Systems definition and preliminary design for the Space Station began 
formally in April of 1985 with eight industry contractors performing 21-month 
Phase B analyses. Preliminary cost estimates from contractors in 1985 ranged 
between $13 and $15 billion. These early studies cost approximately 
$600 million. 
In the spring of 1986, the "power tower" reference configuration was 
modified into a dual keel configuration and formally adopted by NASA at its 
Systems Requirements Review. In the fall of 1986, NASA's Critical Evaluation 
Task Force reviewed the dual keel design and made significant changes, e.g., 
increasing the size of the nodes to accommodate avionics packages slated for 
attachment to the truss, thereby increasing pressurized volume available as 
well as decreasing the requirement for extravehicular activity. 
An April 1986 management review of the Space Station Program initiated by 
NASA Administrator James C. Fletcher provided the impetus for a dedicated Space 
Station Program Office in Reston, Virginia, separate from NASA Headquarters and 
the NASA Centers and assisted by a Space Station Program Support Contractor. 
In the fall of 1986, NASA began a cost and technical review of the Program. 
The four NASA Centers responsible for "work packages" to develop and build the 
Space Station submitted their cost estimates, and NASA Headquarters reviewed 
and adjusted those submissions. The new estimates available in January of 1987 
totalled $14.5 billion in 1984 dollars. This estimate did not include 
experiments, transportation, personnel and facilities, or operations. 
In April of 1987, a phased approach was developed as a means to control cash 
flow, and the Program was divided into Block I and Block 11. Block I, the 
"Revised Baseline Configuration," includes the U.S. laboratory and habitat 
modules, accommodation of attached payloads, polar platform(s), 75 Kw of 
photovoltaic power, European and Japanese modules, the Canadian Mobile 
Servicing System, and provisions for evolution. The proposed Block 11, an 
"Enhanced Configuration," would have an additional 50 K w  of power via a solar 
dynamic system, additional accommodation of attached payloads on dual keels and 
upper and lower booms, a servicing bay, and co-orbiting platforms. 
The Johnson Space Center and Marshall Space Flight Center have been assigned 
a large share of the Program. Marshall's work package consists of pressure 
shells to be used for the U.S. laboratory and habitat modules and the adjoining 
nodes, certain module outfitting, the environmental control system, internal 
audio and video, and internal thermal control. Johnson has overall 
responsibility for the architecture; truss; utility integration; thermal, data, 
communications, tracking, navigation and control systems; a mobile base for the 
Canadian Mobile Servicing Center, and certain module outfitting. Goddard Space 
Flight Center's work package consists of the polar platform, attachments for 
payloads, a Flight Telerobotic Servicer, and certain module outfitting. In the 
proposed Block I1 of the phased approach, Goddard would build a servicing 
facility and a U.S. co-orbiting platform as well. Lewis Research Center is 
responsible for Space Station power, photovoltaic in Block I and solar dynamic 
in the proposed Block 11. Langley Research Center has coordinated design 
analyses and systems engineering and has served as a repository for the many 
studies of various aspects of the Program. 
In June of 1987, NASA issued Requests for Proposals from the four NASA 
centers to conduct Phase C, the final design and development stage. Bidders 
were asked to prepare proposals for the Block I configuration and for a 
combined, "full up" Block I and I1 configuration. NASA is scheduled to 
announce the winning contractors in November of 1987. 
It was in this climate that in the spring of 1987 the President's Assistant 
for National Security Affairs, the Director of the Office of Management and 
Budget, and the President's Science Advisor, with the support of the NASA 
Administrator, requested that the National Research Council study the Space 
Station Program. 
1. I N T R O D U C T I O N  
The Committee on Space Station was formed by the National Research Council, 
at the request of the Executive Office of the President and the National 
Aeronautics and Space Administration. The National Research Council was asked 
to take the President's 1984 decision to develop a space station as its point 
of departure. Within this context, the Committee was asked to: 
- Assess NASA's cost estimates for the Space Station Program. 
- Review the mission priorities and user requirements driving the Space 
Station configuration. 
- Examine the configuration proposed by NASA in the context of 
appropriate mission priorities and user requirements. 
- Identify and assess alternatives to this configuration. 
- Review the arrangements projected for international participation and 
assess how these might be affected by alternative Space Station 
concepts. 
- Report on any other matters that would contribute to the development of 
the Space Station. 
The formal Statement of Task is at Appendix 1 to this report. This document 
called for two reports, one due on June 30, 1987, and the other on September 1, 
1987. The June 30 report was submitted on that date. It is at Appendix 2. 
This is the final report. 
The Committee was formed in late April 1987. A chronology of the 
Committee's major activities is at Appendix 3. A listing of participants is at 
Appendix 4. A bibIiography is at Appendix 5. 
The Committee focused on the broader strategic and policy aspects of the 
Space Station Program, and its findings and recommendations deal with these 
matters. It was not the Committee's purpose to conduct detailed reviews of 
many of the complex technical and engineering challenges presented by the Space 
Station Program. 
The remainder of this report is divided into the following sections: 
2. Conclusions, Findings, and Recommendations 
3. The Space Station Configuration and its Relation to Mission Priorities 
and User Requirements 
4. Alternative Configurations 
5. Space Science and the Space Station 
6.  Space Transportation and the Space Station Program 
7. The Space Station Test Program and Backup Hardware 
8. Space Station Cost Estimates 
9. Management of the Space Station Program 
2. C O N C L U S I O N S ,  
F I N D I N G S ,  A N D  
R E C O M M E N D A T I O N S  
This section summarizes the most important results of the Space Station 
study under two headings--"Conclusions" and "Findings and Recommendations." 
The Committee's conclusions cover broad areas of policy on which the Committee 
wishes to express itself; its findings and recommendations deal with more 
detailed issues which are discussed in the remainder of the report. 
CONCLUSIONS 
The Space Station Program presents a challenge to NASA of formidable 
proportions. Developing the Space Station, deploying and assembling it in 
space, and operating it as a multipurpose international research, development, 
and operational facility must surely rank as the most ambitious and lengthy 
task NASA has ever undertaken. These tasks will absorb much of NASA's energies 
for the next two to three decades. 
It must be recognized, however, that the challenge is more than NASA's 
alone. NASA is the architect and program manager, but the commitment is 
national in character. In pursuing the Space Station Program, the United 
States is committing itself to a major national project that will of necessity 
require tens of billions of dollars and take a decade to bring to operational 
status. Moreover, the Space Station, a key part of our space infrastructure, 
will require a continuing commitment of support for its operation and 
evolution. 
Space Station deployment and operation depends on its associated space 
transportation system; the current Shuttle's ability to support the deployment, 
assembly, and operation of the Station is marginal. Thus, an obligation to 
improve, maintain, and operate a reliable space transportation capability for 
the life of the Space Station is an inherent element of the national commitment 
required for the Space Station Program. 
The Space Station cannot be considered a "one administration" program nor 
can it be developed "on the cheap." The Presidential decision to deploy a 
permanently manned international space station, if implemented by the nation, 
should be accompanied by adequate and predictable funding. The Administration 
and Congress must resolve to make a strong and durable commitment so that the 
success of the Program is not jeopardized by short-sighted yielding to 
budgetary and schedule pressures. 
The durability of the nation's commitment to the Space Station will be 
enhanced if there is a clear understanding of what its long-term role is to 
be. Such an understanding is impossible without defining the long-range goals 
of the United States in space. The National Commission on Space and NASA have 
recently addressed these goals in Pioneering the Svace Frontier and leaders hi^ 
and America's Future in Svace: A Revort to the Administrator, respectively. 
The Administration should give high priority to this matter to assure that 
expensive interruptions do not occur in the Space Station Program because 
national goals to direct its evolution have not been defined. 
Beyond its commitment of national treasure, the United States is staking 
much of its standing as a leader among spacefaring nations on the success of 
the Space Station 'program. The Space Station will be a symbol of the 
competition in space between the United States and the Soviet Union. Moreover, 
our international partners--Canada, Japan, and the nations of the European 
Space Agency--are relying on the Space Station as the foundation for their 
manned space flight programs. Thus, the United States is undertaking an 
obligation to them that should entail predictability of support of the Space 
Station Program, the effective integration of the partners into the development 
and operation of the Space Station, and the tending of the special 
international relationships which are an intrinsic part of these long-term 
commitments. 
It would be misleading, though, to think of the Space Station only in terms 
of its costs and challenges. If the nation develops the Space Station, it 
would be a visible demonstration of American technological and operational 
prowess in space. It would establish the permanent presence there of American 
astronauts and those of our international partners, and it would permit major 
steps forward in our understanding of man's ability to function effectively in 
space for extended periods. The Space Station would be a unique laboratory for 
materials research in microgravity, as well as a test bed for the development 
of systems for long-duration manned missions in space. In due time, it could 
become the base for assembly of the next generation of large scientific 
instruments to observe the universe. It could also become a way station for 
manned lunar and planetary missions. Indeed, if the United States intends to 
pursue an aggressive manned space program, a space station is essential to the 
research, systems development, and accumulation of operational experience 
necessary for such an undertaking. 
FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
The Space Station Configuration and Its 
Relation to Mission Priorities and User Requirements 
Findings 
- The early scientific and engineering uses of the Space Station are 
reasonably well understood. No specific defense or commercial 
applications have been identified. 
- The Block I configuration is a satisfactory starting point for the 
Space Station. It reflects thoughtful compromises among the priorities 
and the sometimes conflicting requirements of its early scientific and 
engineering users. 
- In the absence of agreed-upon long-term space objectives, commitment to 
a particular configuration for Block 11 at this time would be 
premature. Indeed, the next phase of the Space Station could go in any 
of several directions. 
- There is no intrinsic operational and little scientific relationship 
between the polar platform (now included as part of the Block I Space 
Station Program) and the Space Station. Prospective users of the 
co-orbiting platforms (part of the Block II Space Station Program) are 
likely to gain few benefits from man tending. 
Recommendations 
- The Administration should clarify its long-term goals in space before 
committing the Space Station to a specific evolutionary path beyond 
Block I. 
- Development of those technologies likely to be needed for any 
evolutionary path, such as solar dynamic power, should be supported. 
- The polar and co-orbiting platforms should be evaluated on their own 
merits, whether or not carried as part of the Space Station Program. 
Alternative Configurations 
Findings 
- None of the alternative configurations for the Space Station examined 
by the Committee was judged to be as satisfactory as the current 
Block I configuration. 
- Man-tended facilities are not substitutes for a permanently manned 
station, although they may play a complementary role. 
Recommendation 
- Block I should be adopted as the initial Space Station configuration. 
Space Science and the Space Station (1) 
Findings 
- Platforms, other than the Space Station, will be needed by space 
sciences, even after the Station is deployed. 
- Devastating blows have already been dealt U.S. space science by the 
postponement of missions after the Challenger disaster, which followed 
a decade with very few major space science missions. 
- Demands for Shuttle launch services will continue to exceed the 
Shuttle's capacity. This condition will impact scientific access to 
space. 
Recommendations 
- Space science should not be confined to the Space Station. Science 
requirements should dictate the means of access to space. Space 
sciences should continue to be supported with dedicated spacecraft and 
expendable launch vehicles after the Station is deployed. 
- Appropriate NASA offices should assure that timely and sufficient 
investments for Space Station experiments are made. 
- In the short to medium term, every effort should be made to increase 
access to space for scientific purposes. To this end, the on-orbit 
duration capability of the Shuttle should be increased and expendable 
launch vehicles should be used for those missions that do not require 
astronaut involvement. 
( 1 )  Astronomy, astrophysics, solar system exploration, plasma research, earth 
observation sciences, and microgravity research in both materials and life 
sciences are all considered to be part of space science. 
Space Transportation and the Space Station 
Finding 
- The Space Station Program is critically dependent on adequate space 
transportation for its assembly and operation. Deploying the Space 
Station with the post-Challenger Shuttle, while not infeasible, will be 
difficult and risky. 
Recommendations 
- It is highly desirable that the post-Challenger Shuttle be improved in 
performance, while maintaining or increasing its reliability level. 
- - Advanced solid rocket motors with improved performance and 
reliability should be developed for the Shuttle. 
- - NASA should assure high operational reliability and availability 
for the Shuttle, and should establish operational specifications 
for Orbiter replacement, spares, accommodation of downtimes, and 
recovery strategy. 
-- Provision should be made to produce a Shuttle Orbiter, after the 
Challenger replacement, for delivery before Space Station 
deployment begins. 
-- Extended duration on-orbit capabilities should be provided on one 
or more of the Orbiters. 
- The nation should develop a heavy lift launch vehicle for use in the 
latter half of the 1990s to permit the launching of payloads larger 
than those of the Shuttle and to enhance the robustness of the space 
transportation system. 
- NASA should make plans for eventuaI logistical support of the Space 
Stadion with expendable launch vehicles, as well as with the Shuttle. 
- NASA should establish a mandatory requirement for a crew emergency 
rescue vehicle and should consider its use, on a man-rated expendable 
launch vehicle, as a backup means of manned access to the Space 
Station. 
Space Station Test Program and Backup Hardware 
Finding 
- The Committee believes that the Space Station test program and backup 
hardware policy were inadequately defined at the beginning of its 
study. It believes that NASA has since made progress in both areas, 
but NASA must continue development of a test program and backup 
hardware policy, if it is to improve the resilience of the Program. 
Recommendations 
- Because of the complex and potentially unanticipated interactions among 
the Space Station systems, a prototype, as opposed to a protoflight, 
test program should be employed to the maximum extent practicable. (1 
- A centralized Space Station test bed duplicating, to the extent 
practical, the configuration of the Space Station on orbit should be 
retained on the ground. 
- Each launch package should undergo pre-launch integration, using the 
Space Station test bed. 
- Backup hardware to replace flight equipment that might be lost during 
the deployment phase should be procured. NASA needs to develop an 
understanding of contingency scenarios in order to determine the backup 
hardware required. 
Space Station Cost Estimates 
Finding 
- Analyses by the Committee during the second phase of this study have, 
on balance, decreased its confidence in NASA's cost estimates, as 
presented in the Committee's June 30 report. For example, up to 
$3.9 billion in research and development funds over those noted in its 
earlier report--almost a 30 percent increase--could be needed to 
enhance the test program and to buy backup hardware. Additional growth 
could arise from difficulties not now identified. 
(1) A prototype program involves the production of two substantially complete 
sets of hardware--one for ground testing and one for flight. A protoflight 
program would have only one set used for both purposes. 
- The level of definition of the Station operational concept does not 
permit the estimation of steady state operating costs with much 
confidence. 
Recommendations 
- NASA should make a new Space Station Program cost estimate in early 
1988. During this exercise, uncertainties such as those in costs of 
the test program and for backup hardware should be addressed. 
- Increased attention should be focused on estimating and controlling 
Space Station operating costs, so that these costs do not absorb a 
significant portion of the civilian space budget. 
Management of the Space Station Program 
Findings 
- The management challenge presented by the Space Station Program is at 
least as critical to the Program's success as its technical challenges. 
- NASA has moved to strengthen Space Station Program management, but 
additional steps are required. 
- The Committee is not satisfied that the current arrangements to 
coordinate the Space Transportation and Space Station Programs are 
adequate. 
- The Committee believes more attention must be paid to managing the 
operational characteristics of the Space Station. 
Recommendations 
- NASA management must emphasize that the Space Station Program Director 
is the principal line manager of the Space Station Program and is 
accountable for the successful development of the Space Station. 
- The Committee recommends that NASA establish a dedicated Space Station 
project organization that would subordinate all NASA personnel assigned 
to the Space Station to the Program Director and give the Program 
Director control of financial and other resources assigned to the 
Program. 
- An improved liaison structure between the Space Transportation and 
Space Station Programs should be developed as part of the management 
study called for below. 
- An organizational entity, independent of the Space Station development 
hierarchy, with the ultimate responsibility for operating the Space 
Station, should be formed promptly to assure greater attention to 
operations during the design phase. 
- NASA should simplify the structure now envisioned for relations between 
the Station operators and the users of the Space Station. 
- A realistic Space Station development budget should be determined and 
funds provided in a series of multiyear appropriations, thereby giving 
long-term financial predictability to the Program. 
- The Committee recommends that NASA, under the general supervision of 
the Office of Management and Budget, conduct a study analyzing the 
Committee's program management recommendations and concerns. A 
management plan, expressing how NASA intends to respond to the 
Committee's management concerns, should be developed as part of this 
study. An assessment of NASA's progress against this plan should be 
carried out at an appropriate time. 
3. T H E  S P A C E  S T A T I O N  
C O N F I G U R A T I O N  A N D  I T S  
R E L A T I O N  T O  M I S S I O N  P R I O R I T I E S  
A N D  U S E R  R E Q U I R E M E N T S  
The Space Station has been divided into two blocks. The first to be 
deployed, Block I, will consist essentially of a large beam at  the center of 
which will be mounted the U.S. laboratory and habitation modules, the Japanese 
Experiment Module, and the European Space Agency laboratory module. Eight 
solar photovoltaic arrays will be mounted on extensions at the ends of the 
beam, four on each extension, to provide 75 kilowatts of power. Block I would 
also include a U.S. polar orbiting platform. 
Block II would add more power, upper and lower booms, and a servicing 
facility for satellites and other spacecraft. The booms would be attached to 
the central beam by two "keels." The Block I1 booms are intended primarily for 
attaching payloads that look out into space from the upper boom and down toward 
the Earth f om the lower. Block I1 would also add a U.S. co-orbiting 
platform. ( 1 f 
Both configurations--the "Revised Baseline" (Block I) and the "Enhanced 
Configuration" (Block I plus Block 11)--include provisions for Shuttle docking 
and attachment of logistics modules. They also include subsystems such as the 
environmental control and life support subsystem, the data manageqent 
subsystem, and other provisions necessary for a viable, productive space 
Station. Figure 1 is an artist's rendition of the "Revised Baseline" and the 
"Enhanced Configuration." 
The Revised Baseline has been configured primarily for microgravity 
materials and life sciences research. It should be a satisfactory materials 
sciences laboratory, with very low acceleration (microgravity) levels. 
The Revised Baseline will provide a giant step forward for the life 
sciences, permitting man, animals, and plants to be exposed to rnicrogravity 
for extended periods. The Revised Baseline will accommodate small animals and 
a small centrifuge to permit studies of the responses of these animals to 
variable gravity. 
(1) NASA also refers to Block I and Block I1 as Phase 1 and Phase 2, 
respectively. 
Photograph courtesy of NASA 
However, the Revised Baseline does not provide all that the life scientists 
may ultimately need. For example, it would be difficult to accommodate large 
animals and to install a large variable force centrifuge in this 
configuration. Moreover in the Revised Baseline, life and materials sciences 
must be conducted in the same laboratories. Adequate isolation can be achieved 
in the Revised Baseline by engineering and operational measures, but 
eventually, if the United States decides to undertake long duration manned 
interplanetary missions, a dedicated life sciences module may be a necessary 
addition to the Space Station. 
The Revised Baseline will provide a good test bed for the development of 
technologies for extended manned space flight in such areas as environmental 
control and life support, power, and thermal control. 
Because commercial applications of the Space Station have not yet been 
defined, it is impractical to plan specific accommodations for such 
applications. However, there is no obvious reason that the Revised Baseline 
could not be used for a number of conceivable commercial applications. 
The Department of Defense has not enunciated specific purposes for which it 
might want to use the Space Station. Thus, the design of the Space Station has 
not been influenced by Department of Defense requirements. 
The Revised Baseline has only limited capabilities to accommodate attached 
payloads for earth- and space-directed observations. It has no capability for 
satellite servicing, construction of large space structures, or for staging 
manned missions to the moon or to the planets. 
The Enhanced Configuration with its servicing facility, the booms for 
additional attached payloads, and more electrical power would be a more capable 
Space Station. The servicing facility could be used to assemble some large 
space structures--perhaps one or more of the next generation of large 
observatories envisioned for about the year 2000, for example--but the Enhanced 
Configuration would have to be substantially modified to serve as a 
transportation node for development of a lunar base or for manned journeys to 
Mars. The Enhanced Configuration would not remove the constraints on life 
sciences research inherent in the Revised Baseline. 
In conclusion, it is the Committee's judgment that on balance the mission 
priorities reflected in the Revised Baseline design are reasonable. It is a 
good compromise among the needs of early users of the Space Station, and it 
accommodates the framework established for the Space Station by national 
policy. The Revised Baseline would be a useful productive facility even with 
the limitations noted and even if further evolution does not occur. 
It is not clear that Block I1 reflects the right priorities for Space 
Station evolution. The Space Station will be in the wrong orbit to serve as a 
good Earth observation platform. The most important astronomy and solar system 
exploration experiments can best be deployed on free flying spacecraft. Thus, 
the upper and lower booms may not add much to the Station as a platform for 
science. A strong case has not been made for a satellite servicing 
requirement. Moreover, other directions of evolution might prove to be more 
important. For example, if the United States decides to pursue manned 
planetary explorations in the next century, the addition of a dedicated life 
sciences module to accommodate a large centrifuge and adequate facilities for 
animals might be the preferred next step. The adoption of other objectives 
could lead in quite different directions. Thus, the Committee believes that a 
commitment to Block I1 at this time would be premature. 
It is important for NASA to continue to study the effects on the Revised 
Baseline of alternative evolutionary paths. Such studies will suggest what 
detailed provisions for evolution should be designed into this configuration. 
It seems highly probable that any evolution beyond Block I will require more 
power; thus, continued development of solar dynamic power technology, an 
important element of Block 11, is strongly supported by the Committee. 
The polar orbiting platform, part of Block I, would be launched from the 
Western Test Range on an expendable launch vehicle. It would carry instruments 
primarily supporting the Earth observational sciences. The co-orbiting 
platform, part of Block 11, would be deployed in an orbit close to that of the 
Space Station. It would carry instruments primarily for space observations. 
The Committee finds no intrinsic operational or strong scientific 
relationship between the Space Station, on the one hand, and the polar orbiting 
platform, on the other. Moreover, many of the potential users of the 
co-orbiting platform stand to gain little by man tending. Orbital requirements 
for astronomy are largely incompatible with the Space Station orbit. Users of 
the co-orbiting platform would be better served by individual free flyers. 
Thus, the polar and co-orbiting platforms should be evaluated on their own 
merits whether or not they are managed as part of the Space Station Program. 
Finally, it is important to understand that the Space Station will not be a 
space system in the usual sense. Instead it will be a research facility in 
space, and potentially an operational base, that will change and adapt to serve 
a host of applications that cannot now be foreseen. These characteristics 
imply, among other things, that national space goals should be defined prior to 
the development of each later block of the Space Station if expensive 
interruptions are to be avoided in the Space Station Program. 
In summary, the Committee believes that the Revised Baseline--the Block I 
configuration--is a satisfactory starting point for the Space Station, given 
the present ambiguity in national space goals. However, it wishes to emphasize 
that Block I is only a starting point; if the United States is going to remain 
a leader among spacefaring nations, the Station must evolve to support this 
role. Lack of consensus on our long-term objectives in space limits the extent 
to which this evolution can now be foreseen; thus it is too early to commit to 
Block 11. Those technologies likely to be needed in any evolutionary path, 
such as solar dynamic power, should be supported. 
4. A L T E R N A T I V E  
C O N F I G U R A T I O N S  
The Committee examined a number of alternative configurations for the Space 
Station, including those from which NASA derived the current configuration. 
The Committee also reviewed proposals by scientists and engineers outside NASA, 
and examined concepts for man-tended facilities currently under development. 
In its study of Space Station configurations, NASA examined a wide range of 
alternatives for the Space Station--a range that virtually exhausted all 
fundamentally different possibilities. Alternatives to the current 
configuration were eventually rejected for such reasons as: 
- higher acceleration (microgravity) levels than Block I; 
- less desirable orientation relative to the Earth and space; 
- more limited access for construction and support; and 
- lesser growth potential. 
The Committee in its review found no strong reasons to disagree with NASA's 
analysis of these alternatives. 
Proposals from outside NASA have not, in general, been proposals for 
reasonably complete alternative Space Station configurations. Some deal only, 
or primarily, with construction systems; others with the size or arrangement of 
pressurized modules. NASA's current approach embodies some of the basic ideas 
from the construction system alternatives, and NASA considered many alternative 
arrangements of modules in its study of alternative configurations. The 
Committee did not find attractive alternatives to the Block I configuration in 
proposals from outside NASA. 
Finally, man-tended facilities were examined. Such facilities may have 
important roles to play in Space Station related development and in materials 
and life sciences research before and possibly after the Space Station is 
deployed. The Committee encourages NASA to exploit such facilities as 
appropriate. 
However, man-tended facilities do not allow the frequent manned interaction 
that will be required by a significant number of important experiments. Nor do 
they provide the long-term exposure of humans to microgravity needed by life 
scientists. Clearly, man-tended facilities are not substitutes for a 
permanently manned facility. 
In summary, none of the alternative configurations was judged to be as 
satisfactory as the current configuration. 
5. S P A C E  S C I E N C E  A N D  
T H E  S P A C E  S T A T I O N  
In the third section of this report, the strengths and weaknesses of the 
Block I Space Station were discussed. In summary, Block I will provide a good 
platform for microgravity work in materials and life sciences. However, it is 
in the wrong orbit for most Earth observations, and many scientific missions in 
solar system exploration and astronomy cannot be effectively performed in 
conjunction with the Space Station. 
These characteristics of the Space Station clearly imply that other 
platforms will be needed by the space sciences even after the Space Station is 
operational. Moreover, expendable launch vehicles will be best suited to 
launch many of these spacecraft because the Shuttle cannot attain (or can 
attain only with difficulty) the desired trajectories. Thus, it is important 
that space sciences not be confined, made hostage if you will, to the Space 
Station and the Shuttle. 
Devastating blows have already been dealt American space science by the 
postponement of missions after the Challenger disaster, which followed a decade 
with very few major space science missions. Not only has the launch of many 
science payloads been delayed, but the lower flight rates now expected from the 
Shuttle and the existing backlog of non-science payloads will drastically 
reduce future scientific access to space. Furthermore, the Shuttle will be 
needed for technology experiments to support Space Station development. These 
payloads, and demands in life and materials sciences, will keep pressure on the 
Shuttle for the next several years. 
The Committee thus believes that in the short and medium term, every effort 
should be made to increase access to space for astronomy, solar system 
exploration, plasma research, and earth observation sciences, to work off the 
backlogs created by exclusive reliance on and problems with the Shuttle. Given 
expected Shuttle flight rates and other demands on the Shuttle, expendable 
launch vehicles will be essential for this purpose. 
The productivity of the Shuttle should also be increased. One of the few 
ways to do this is to increase its capability to remain on orbit for a longer 
time. The Committee thus believes this is a cost effective way in the near 
term to enhance access to space for a number of important users. Extended 
on-orbit duration will also provide greater robustness in the Space Station 
assembly process. The Committee thus recommends that appropriate modifications 
be made to one or more of the Orbiters to increase their stay time on orbit 
from the current level of about one week to about two weeks. This step would 
make this capability available for those missions on which it is needed. 
Finally, Space Station budgets do not and should not include funds for 
development of the scientific experiments needed to make the Station a 
productive research facility. However, NASA should assure that timely and 
sufficient investments for experiments are made in order to exploit the special 
capabilities the Space Station will offer. 
6. S P A C E  T R A N S P O R T A T I O N  
A N D  T H E  
S P A C E  S T A T I O N  P R O G R A M  
SPACE TRANSPORTATION FOR DEPLOYING THE SPACE STATION 
From the inception of the Space Station Program, the Shuttle has been the 
sole means of space transportation contemplated for Station deployment and 
support. This has resulted in a Space Station design constrained by the 
Shuttle cargo bay dimensions and the Shuttle's weight-lifting capacity. These 
constraints have increased the difficulty of satisfying user requirements in a 
number of ways. For example, module size limitations have led to intense 
competition among the users for pressurized volume in the modules. In 
addition, sharing of modules by life and materials sciences, for example, has 
exacerbated the problem of assuring adequate isolation of experiments from each 
other. Moreover, dimensional constraints have limited the size of scientific 
apparatus (for example, centrifuges for the life sciences) available to the 
users. These Shuttle-associated constraints are likely to be even more 
confining when the Space Station begins to evolve in the latter half of the 
1990s to support more ambitious manned space endeavors. 
The deployment process and the operational concept also have been influenced 
by the lack of other means of space transportation. For example, use of the 
Shuttle will require substantial levels of extravehicular activity and on-orbit 
outfitting of the laboratory and habitation modules. The constraints imposed 
by the Shuttle have become more restrictive as Shuttle capabilities have been 
reduced, first by shortfalls from original specifications and later by the 
modifications required after the Challenger accident. 
The Committee believes that deployment of the Space Station with the 
post-Challenger Shuttle--the Shuttle that will be available after the current 
round of modifications are complete--while not infeasible, will be difficult 
and risky. For example, NASA has estimated that the orbital life of the first 
two elements of the Space Station, in the event of failure of the Station 
reboost system, would be only about 20 days. This means that if the reboost 
system fails, the Station orbit would decay within about 20 days and the 
deployed elements of the Station would be lost. This vulnerability is not 
acceptable and must be corrected.(') To deploy Block I with the 
(I) One way to reduce the vulnerability of the Station to orbital decay would 
be to reduce the payload weights of the first two Space Station launches 
post-Challenger Shuttle would require about 18 flights, and as indicated 
earlier, it would require a large amount of extravehicular activity and 
on-orbit outfitting of the U.S. modules. Thus, the Committee believes that 
improved space transportation is needed for a sound Space Station Program. Two 
means are currently available--improving the Shuttle and developing a heavy 
lift launch vehicle. 
The Shuttle would be improved primarily by providing new solid rocket motors 
with increased performance and reliability. The development of these motors is 
estimated by NASA to cost about $0.8 to $1.6 billion in 1988 dollars. 
Two approaches to acquiring a heavy lift launch vehicle were examined by the 
Committee. One approach would use a new cargo canister and existing Shuttle 
components--solid rocket boosters, two or three used main engines, their 
supporting structure and plumbing, and the Shuttle external tank. The main 
engines of this Shuttle-derived vehicle would not be recovered after launch. 
The other approach would be to use a vehicle, independent of the Shuttle, 
from the joint NASA-Department of Defense Advanced Launch System Program. 
The objective of this program is to develop, by about 1998, a heavy lift 
vehicle with greatly reduced recurring costs. For this effort to be able to 
support the Block I Space Station Program on anything similar to the current 
schedule, an interim advanced launch vehicle would be needed. 
carried out by the post-Challenger Shuttle, thus permitting the Shuttle to 
place these payloads in higher orbits. However, probable weight growth in 
Space Station components would exacerbate the problem, and NASA indicated 
in its presentations to the Committee that these two payloads could not be 
significantly reduced. 
Subsequent to the Committee's completion of its work, NASA indicated that 
it was exploring ways to reduce the weights of these payloads. Preliminary 
studies suggest that reductions might be possible that would permit the 
post-Challenger Shuttle to place the first two payloads in orbits high 
enough to eliminate their vulnerability to early orbital decay. 
However, relatively low orbital decay times in the event of reboost failure 
(on the order of 50 days) persist throughout most of the assembly 
sequence. This condition illustrates the relatively narrow margins that 
exist during the deployment of the Space Station with the post-Challenger 
Shuttle. 
The costs of achieving the reductions in the first two payloads would 
include one more Shuttle flight to carry up the equipment removed from the 
first two flights, about 10-15 more hours of extravehicular activity, and 
some redundant guidance, navigation, and control equipment. Even if such 
reductions eventually prove to be practical, the Committee believes that 
its recommendations on improving the Shuttle and developing a heavy lift 
launch vehicle (presented in subsequent paragraphs) are still valid. 
The NASA estimates in Table 1, on the next page, compare the alternatives in 
a number of dimensions, assuming operations according to plan and no launch 
failures. 
These estimates show that an Improved Shuttle would result in the following 
improvements over the post-Challenger Shuttle alternative: 
- Orbital life of the first Space Station element deployed, with reboost 
failure, would be increased from about 20 days to about 240 days, 
enough time get a Shuttle to the Station before the Station's orbit 
would decay. 8 1 
- A 40-hour reduction in extravehicular activity required to deploy 
Block I. 
- Less on-orbit outfitting of the laboratory and habitation modules. 
- A reduction in the number of flights required to deploy Block I of 
about four. 
An improved Shuttle would also increase the probability of deploying the 
Space Station without a Shuttle standdown--partly because of the fewer number 
of flights required and partly because an Improved Shuttle should be more 
reliable. 
The greater Shuttle payload capability, which would be available on every 
Improved Shuttle flight, would support heavy payload missions other than 
deployment and operation of the Space Station. This capability would also 
increase the overall productivity of the Shuttle by 25 to 30 percent for those 
missions that would otherwise be limited by Shuttle payload weight capability. 
Table 1 also shows how a heavy lift launch vehicle would affect the measures 
discussed above if it were available on the Block I schedule. On most 
measures, it gives greater improvement than the Improved Shuttle. Moreover, if 
a heavy lift launch vehicle were available for launch of the first elements of 
the Space Station, full operational capability of the Station could be achieved 
12 to 18 months earlier. 
However, heavy lift launch vehicles would require remote docking 
capabilities earlier than would otherwise be required, and remote docking would 
complicate on-orbit Space Station assembIy operations. Remote docking would 
also require orbital maneuvering vehicles or automatic docking systems to 
assist in maneuvering the large payloads brought up on the heavy lift 
vehicles. 
(1) The orbital decay times throughout the assembly sequence are, in the main, 
markedly better with the Improved Shuttle than with the post-Challenger 
Shuttle. 
TABLE 1 
Estimated Effects of Alternative Space Transportation Systems 
on Block I Space Station Deployment (NASA Estimates) 
S ~ a c e  Trans~ortat ion Alternatives 
Post-Challenger Improved 
Shuttle and Shuttle and 
Post-Challenger Improved Heavy Lift Heavy Lift 
Shuttle Shuttle Vehicle Vehicle 
Orbital Life of the 
First Two Payloads (days) 
with No Resupply (1) >360 >15 000 >15 000 >15,000 
and with 





Laboratory ~ o d u l e  
Habitation Module 
Total Number of Flights 
to Full Operation 
Capability 18 
Shuttle Flights 18 
Heavy Lift Flights 0 
Remote Docking Reciuired No No Yes 
Flight on which 
Permanently Manned 
Capability Achieved 
(1 )  The numbers on this line are measures of the time available to replenish the 
reboost systems. 
Yes 
(2) The numbers on this line are the orbital decay times if the reboost system 
fails and is not repaired. 
NASA estimates that a Shuttle-derived heavy lift launch vehicle and its 
associated support facilities could be developed for about $1.1 to $1.7 billion 
(in 1988 dollars), and it could place payloads on orbit with recurring costs 
per pound roughly comparable to those of the Shuttle. However, it is presently 
unclear what additional uses such a vehicle would have after the four or five 
flights needed for deployment of the Block I Space Station because it is likely 
to face competition from a more economical vehicle from the Advanced Launch 
System Program. 
On the other hand, the Committee does not believe that an interim vehicle 
can be depended on from the Advanced Launch System Program on schedules roughly 
consistent with Block I Space Station deployment. 
The Committee concluded from this analysis that the Improved Shuttle is the 
preferred way to enhance the space transportation system at this time, and that 
the United States should move promptly to acquire capabilities to launch larger 
payloads than even the Improved Shuttle can accommodate. 
Thus, the Committee strongly supports NASA's plans to develop an advanced 
solid rocket motor and other appropriate components that would enhance both the 
performance and reliability of the post-Challenger Shuttle. 
The Committee wishes to emphasize, however, that the gains discussed above 
will be achieved in the Space Station Program only if the weights of Space 
Station components are strictly controlled and if the performance improvements 
estimated for the Improved Shuttle are largely realized. Significant 
degradations in either of these two estimates or in Shuttle reliability would 
swiftly erode the most important gains for the Space Station Program. 
The Committee also recommends that the nation start now to escape the 
constraining effects of the Shuttle on future space programs by developing a 
heavy Pift launch vehicle for use by the latter half of the 1990s. Such a 
vehicle would remove the dimensional and weight constraints imposed by the 
Shuttle, thus increasing the options available for evolution of the Space 
Station, and it would provide a hedge, albeit late, against diminished 
performance of the Improved Shuttle and weight growth in the Space Station. 
A heavy lift launch vehicle would provide other benefits, namely: 
- an option to pursue more aggressive lunar and planetary exploration 
programs, such as the Mars sample return missions; 
- the ability to launch payloads that would otherwise be manifested on 
the Shuttle, allowing the Shuttle to be dedicated to crew-intensive and 
Shuttle unique missions; and 
- a stronger U.S. position vis-a-vis the Soviet Union for possible future 
cooperative space ventures. 
Finally, a heavy lift launch vehicle would increase the robustness of the 
U.S. space transportation system as a whole, a matter of substantial importance 
in its own right. 
OTHER SHUTTLE-RELATED MEASURES 
The Committee believes that the nation must realize that the Shuttle Orbiter 
fleet is likely to continue to suffer occasional attrition. It is dangerous 
and misleading to assume that there will be no losses and thus to fail to plan 
for such events. For example, if the Shuttle resumes flying in late 1988, 
about 90 flights could occur by late 1996 when Block I will be nearing 
completion. If the probability of damaging an Orbiter beyond repair on any 
single Shuttle flight is 1 percent--the demonstrated rate is now one loss in 25 
launches, or 4 percent--the probability of losing an Orbiter before Block I is 
complete is about 60 percent. Put another way, we should expect to lose an 
Orbiter--not necessarily with accompanying loss of life--about once every 
5-8 years, if the single flight loss probability is in the range of 1 percent 
to 2 percent. 
To accommodate this likelihood, production of the first Orbiter after the 
Challenger replacement should be planned for delivery before Space Station 
deployment begins. 
It is noteworthy that NASA does not have quantitative estimates of important 
probabilities such as that for loss of an Orbiter or that for loss of a Shuttle 
payload. At a somewhat more detailed level, NASA does not have quantitative 
reliability models of important Shuttle components such as the solid rocket 
motors. Recognizing the difficulty of making accurate quantitative reliability 
estimates, the Committee nevertheless believes that NASA should develop 
reliability and safety models for the Shuttle and other major space 
transportation systems, and for the Space Station itself. The models should be 
quantitative and based first on theory and then on empirical data as the latter 
are acquired. These models should be used to assist in improving reliability 
and safety, in prediction of losses, and in development of replacement and 
logistic support strategies. 
CREW EMERGENCY RESCUE AND 
SPACE STATION LOGISTICS SUPPORT 
As noted earlier, the Space Station Program is totally dependent on the 
Space Shuttle for crew transfers to and from the Station. A "safe haven" 
approach has been envisioned for use during Space Station emergencies with 
rescue, if required, effected by the Shuttle. However, as the Challenger 
accident has shown, Shuttle downtimes can be very long. Thus, the Committee 
strongly believes that there is a mandatory requirement for a crew emergency 
rescue vehicle. 
NASA is currently considering what capabilities, if any, such a vehicle 
should have in addition to those essential to crew rescue. The crew emergency 
rescue vehicle could eventually be part of a backup means of manned ascent to 
the Space Station, using a man-rated expendable launch vehicle for propulsion. 
Such a backup capability would hedge further against problems with the Shuttle 
and should be considered by NASA in defining the crew emergency rescue vehicle. 
The Committee also recommends that NASA plan to provide limited logistics 
support to the Space Station, using existing or planned types of expendable 
launch vehicles, to back up the Shuttle. 
SUMMARY 
In summary, there are a number of actions that need to be taken to make the 
space transportation system more robust. With respect to the Shuttle, it 
should be improved in performance and reliability, it should be given an 
extended on-orbit duration capability as noted in Section 5, page 18, and the 
Shuttle Program should be funded for an additional Orbiter replacement beyond 
the Challenger replacement. Beyond assuring an adequate Shuttle launch 
capability, the nation should initiate development of a heavy lift launch 
vehicle, and NASA should provide the Space Station with the means for logistics 
resupply using existing and/or planned expendable launch vehicles. NASA also 
should provide a reliable non-Shuttle derived rescue capability for the Space 
Station. 
7. T H E  S P A C E  S T A T I O N  
T E S T  P R O G R A M  A N D  
B A C K U P  H A R D W A R E  
When the Committee's Space Station study began, NASA indicated that it 
intended to use a "protoflight" approach to testing. NASA said that it would 
produce one set of hardware that would first be used for ground testing and 
qualification; this hardware would then be refurbished and used to build the 
Space Station. In short, the test hardware would become the flight hardware. 
The justification for this policy was to reduce the cost of the Space Station 
Program, but in the form described by NASA, it would have had a number of 
undesirable consequences. These in part led to the Committee's concerns, 
expressed in the June 30 report, about integration and backup hardware. In the 
second phase of the study, NASA dispelled many of the Committee's concerns on 
this issue: 
- NASA now indicates that, with a few exceptions, it will produce two 
substantially complete sets of Space Station hardware--one for ground 
functional and qualification testing and one for flight. 
- Individual subsystems will be fully integrated, tested, and qualified 
using dedicated qualification test hardware. 
- The laboratory and habitation modules will also be integrated and 
qualified, using refurbished qualification-test subsystem hardware. 
- Flight elements, consisting of the hardware intended for flight, will 
be assembled, checked out, and acceptance tested on the ground before 
flight. These accepted flight elements will then be disassembled only 
as necessary to prepare them for launch and acceptance tested in the 
launch configuration. 
The Committee supports this "modified prototype" approach and believes the 
following additional steps are essential for an adequate ground test program 
and adequate backup capability: 
- A centralized Space Station test bed, duplicating, to the extent 
practical, the configuration of the Space Station on orbit, should be 
retained on the ground. This test bed could consist of refurbished 
qualification test equipment and backup hardware. In the judgment of 
the Committee, its possible cannibalization in the event flight 
equipment is lost is an acceptable risk. 
- Each launch package should undergo pre-launch integration, using the 
Space Station test bed. This process should detect problems on the 
ground that might otherwise occur on orbit. 
- Backup hardware to replace flight equipment that might be lost during 
the deployment phase should be procured. This hardware should 
supplement the initial spares planned for the deployment phase. Should 
this equipment not be needed in Block I, it would be available for 
evolution of the Space Station; thus, little of it should ultimately be 
wasted. In order to determine what backup hardware to procure, NASA 
should develop a good understanding of contingencies that could result 
in loss of equipment. 
8. S P A C E  S T A T I O N  
C O S T  E S T I M A T E S  
An assessment of Space Station cost estimates was the focus of the 
Committee's June 30 report. During the second phase of its study, the 
Committee gained further insights into these estimates. On balance, these 
insights decreased the Committee's confidence in the earlier estimates. 
- First, the Committee notes that the Space Station Program is still in 
flux. A number of changes occurred in the Space Station Program during 
the short course of this study. These include such matters as the test 
program, crew rotation plans (discussed below), reduced commitment to 
the current Block I1 (the features of which were part of the baseline 
program until just prior to the study), and replanning of the 
deployment process as problems with space transportation have become 
more apparent. Other changes are almost certainly underway, and they 
are likely to continue for some time, with net tendencies to increase 
costs (or alternatively to reduce performance). 
- Second, the Committee conducted a detailed review of the cost model 
used at Marshall Space Flight Center and the application of this model, 
both at Marshall and at Headquarters. The results of this review 
reduced the Committee's confidence in the cost estimates for Space 
Station hardware under the control of Marshall. 
- Third, the test program initially characterized by NASA as 
"protoflight," when studied in detail, was shown to be in fact more 
nearly a "prototype" test program. The Committee commends NASA for 
adopting the more conservative test program. NASA has said that its 
cost estimates provide for the additional hardware implied by this 
change. But program level guidance to the Centers for the cost 
estimating exercise leading to current NASA cost e timates clearly 
called for estimates based on a protoflight policy.(ls) Thus, the 
(1) The General Accounting Office, in a contemporaneous study, developed the 
same finding. See "Space Station National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration's 1987 Cost Estimate," (Fact Sheet for the Chairman, 
Committee on Science, Space, and Technology, House of Representatives), 
Appendix I, p. 6. 
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Committee is concerned that current estimates do not cover all of the 
hardware needed for the test program now evidently planned by NASA. 
- The Committee remains strongly convinced that the Space Station 
Information System is not well defined, nor is the related automation 
and robotics strategy for the Space Station. This has implications for 
the confidence that can be placed in both the development estimates and 
the estimates of operational costs. 
The Committee reviewed the operational concept for the Space Station. Much 
good work has been done on this concept, but the level of definition of the 
concept does not permit the estimation of steady-state operating costs with 
much confidence. The Committee believes that it is important for NASA to give 
increased attention to this area, because high Space Station operating costs 
could potentially absorb a significant portion of the civilian space budget. 
Moreover, this matter is of great concern to our international partners who, 
properly, are being asked to defray part of these costs. Their space programs 
are smaller than ours, and unanticipated operating costs could have relatively 
more serious implications for their programs than for ours. 
A significant part of total operating costs after the Space Station reaches 
full operational status will be incurred for crew rotation and logistics 
support. During the course of the study, NASA revised its planning from eight 
Shuttle flights per year to five for these purposes. This reduction stems 
directly from crew rotation considerations. When the Committee was first 
briefed on crew rotation plans, NASA intended Space Station tours of duty to be 
90 days. With eight Space Station crew members, eight Shuttle trips per year, 
rotating four astronauts each trip, would be needed. By increasing the planned 
stay time to 180 days, the number of Shuttle flights required would be reduced 
to four. NASA now intends to fly five crew rotation flights per year. This is 
one more than needed for a 180-day stay and would provide some flexibility in 
logistics operations. 
The Committee has no definitive reasons to doubt that such long stay times 
can become standard practice, but notes that insufficient medical and 
psychological data are now available to the United States to provide high 
confidence that such practices can be employed. NASA's plans provide for 
gradually increasing crew stay times, while such data are being collected, to 
insure that astronauts are not endangered during the testing period. 
Tables 2 and 3 present revised estimates paralleling those in the 
Committee's June 30 report. The estimates from the June 30 report are shown in 
the left column for comparison. The tables include costs only for Block I, and 
the revised estimates are stated in both 1984 and 1988 dollars. The Committee 
used NASA's inflation factors to adjust the 1984 estimates. The major changes 
in these tables are: 
- Increased costs for the test program to reflect the change from 
"protoflight" to "modified prototype." As pointed out earIier, NASA 
argues that its program has not changed and that its earlier estimates 
TABLE 2 (1) 
Block I Space Station Research and Development Cost Estimates (2) 
(Billions of Dollars) 
June 30 
Estimate Revised Estimates 
BLOCK I BLOCK I BLOCK I 
(1984 Dollars) (1984 Dollars) (1988 Dollars) 
Phased Approach--Block I (3) $12.2 $12.2 $ 14.6 
Flight Telerobotic Servicer 
Crew Emergency Rescue Vehicles 1 .5(5) 1 .5(5) 1.8 
Test Program Enhancement - - 0.0-2.5 0.0-3.0 
Backup Hardware - - 0.2- 1.4 0.2- 1.7 
Total Research and Development $14.0(~) $14.2- 17.9(~)  $17.0-21.5 
(1) All estimates in this table, except for that for Test Program 
Enhancement, are NASA estimates. They do not include international 
partners' costs. 
(2) The estimates in this table include funds for Space Station that are in 
(or would be added to) NASA's Research and Development account. This 
account pays for hardware and services purchased from contractors by 
NASA, e.g., for the development and production of Space Station flight 
hardware, ground support and test equipment, software, and the 
integration of Space Station systems. The Space Station R&D account 
does not cover other costs such as construction of Space Station 
facilities, launch services, salaries of NASA personnel working on the 
Space Station Program, and operational costs. 
(3) The phased approach would deploy Space Station in two blocks. Block I, 
the "Revised Baseline," in NASA terminology, would consist of the U.S. 
laboratory and habitation modules, the two laboratory modules from Japan 
and the European Space Agency, 75 KW of photovoltaic power and other 
supporting systems and structures. 
(4) These funds are in NASA's financial plan. 
( 5 )  Development and procurement of two vehicles; funds are not in NASA's 
financial plan. Source of this estimate is testimony of the Director, 
Space Station Program Office, before the House Subcommittee on Space 
Science and Applications, April 8, 1987. He stressed that this estimate 
is highly uncertain because of the early state of 'crew emergency rescue 
vehicle definition. 
(6) In addition to these costs, NASA has planned "transition definition" 
studies--early conceptual studies of Space Station evolutionary 
possibilities--in the amount of $0.2 billion, during the development and 
deployment of Space Station. 
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TABLE 3 
Estimated Total Costs to Develop and Deploy Space Station 
(Billions of Dollars) 
June 30 
Estimate Revised Estimates 
BLOCK I BLOCK I BLOCK I 
(1984 Dollars) (1984 Dollars) (1988 Dollars) 
TotaI Research and Development 
(from Table 2) 
Elements Essential to Space 
Station Carried i 
NASA Accounts ?2Yther 
Space Transportation (3) 1.5 1.2-1.5 1.4- 1.8 
Operations Prior to 
Full Operational 
Capability 
NASA Personnel (Direct & 
Indirect) 
Related Facilities 0.2 0.2 0.2 
Shuttle Mods for Space Station 0.1 0.1 0.1 
Extended Duration Orbiter - - 0.1 0.1 
Estimated Total Space Station $ 21.0 $ 21.0-25.0 $ 25.0-29.9 
Program Costs 
(1) All estimates in this table are NASA estimates. They do not include 
international partners' costs. No operating costs after full 
operational capability are included in these estimates. 
(2 )  The elements of cost listed below are covered in other NASA accounts, 
except for modifications to the Shuttle to permit it to berth at Space 
Station; Shuttle modification costs will eventually appear in the Space 
Transportation Program, not in Space Station estimates. 
(3) Estimates reflect prices charged to the Department of Defense for 
Shuttle launches. This is a readily available approximation of the 
price of Shuttle launch services, and is one measure of the opportunity 
costs associated with Space Station uses of the Shuttle. Low end of 
range, 15 Shuttle flights; high end, 19. 
cover the equipment and testing now planned. The Committee had an 
independent estimate made of these effects, based on assumptions that 
NASA's current estimates are for a protoflight program and that the 
program is in fact prototype. This independent estimate totals 
$2.5 billion in 1984 dollars. Table 2, therefore, shows a range for 
test program enhancement of from $0.0 to $2.5 billion. The true cost 
probably will lie between these two values. 
Cost of backup hardware. NASA has not settled on a policy for the 
procurement of backup hardware. A policy of acquiring only minimal 
amounts of backup hardware would reduce lead times for the longest lead 
time elements of the Space Station so that they would not pace the 
resumption of deployment after a launch system standdown. NASA 
estimates that this policy would cost about $0.2 billion. 
Alternatively, enough equipment could be procured, in addition to the 
already planned purchase of spares, to provide a complete "ship-set" of 
Space Station hardware. This policy would cost about $1.4 billion, 
according to NASA estimates. This range--$0.2 to $1.4 billion--is 
shown in Table 2. 
It should be stressed that the tables do not include the costs for advanced 
solid rocket motors, heavy lift launch vehicles, and any expendable launch 
vehicles that might ultimately be required. 
The Committee notes that Table 2 indicates that there could be up to a 
$3.9 billion increase, almost 30 percent, in Space Station research and 
development costs, over those identified in the Committee's June 30 report, for 
backup hardware and test program enhancements alone. 
In view of the continuing uncertainties surrounding Program costs, the 
Committee recommends that NASA prepare a new cost estimate as part of the 
Program Requirements Review which will occur early in 1988. NASA already has 
the services of its Program Support Contractor and at that time will have 
definitive contracts with its prime contractors. These circumstances will 
provide a far better framework for arriving at estimates in which more 
confidence can be placed. 
These new estimates should cover all costs of the Space Station Program, 
generally as outlined in Table 3, and they should specifically address the test 
program and backup hardware uncertainties discussed above, as well as the 
impact of changes to the transportation system. The Space Station impact on 
the overall NASA budget should also be examined. Once these new Space Station 
estimates are made they should be documented, controlled, and updated on a 
continuing basis in response to engineering economic studies of the Space 
Station Program. 
9. M A N A G E M E N T  O F  T H E  
S P A C E  S T A T I O N  P R O G R A M  
This report has emphasized the magnitude of the technical challenge 
presented to NASA by the Space Station Program. The Committee believes that 
management of the Program represents an area of equal risk to the successful 
development and deployment of the Space Station. Accordingly, high priority 
must be placed on enhancing and supporting Space Station Program management. 
STRENGTHENING PROGRAM MANAGEMENT 
NASA is to be commended for the steps it has already taken in this 
direction. In the spring of 1986, the Administrator of NASA asked General 
Samuel C. Phillips, former director of the Apollo Program, to review Space 
Station organization and management. In response to the recommendations of his 
committee, NASA: 
- Established a Space Station Program Office, independent of the Centers. 
- Selected a Program Support Contractor to assist the Space Station 
Program Office. 
- Altered work assignments among NASA Centers to increase Program 
efficiency. 
- Formally subordinated the Station project managers at the NASA Centers 
to the Space Station Program Director. 
- Developed enhanced planning and documentation systems for the Space 
Station Program. 
The resulting more centralized arrangement is clearly more appropriate to 
the challenges of the Space Station Program than its predecessor, a 
"lead-center" structure. However, it does not go far enough; the following 
additional measures are needed: 
- NASA management must emphasize that the Space Station Program Director 
is the principal line manager of the Space Station Program and is 
accountable for the successful development of the Space Station. He 
must be equipped with authority commensurate with this accountability. 
- The Space Station Program Office must be continually supported and 
reinforced by senior NASA management. There are likely to be 
tendencies for control of the Space Station Program to move away from 
the Program Office to the NASA Centers. Such diffusion of influence 
would be highly inappropriate for the Space Station Program. 
Reinforcement can come from support to the Program Office on such 
issues as timely authorization of adequate staff, the extent of the 
Station Program Director's authority over Station project managers at 
the Centers, and establishment of the Program Office's role in the 
decision-making structure for the Space Station. In this latter 
regard, the Committee welcomes the revitalization of the Management 
Council, with the Space Station Program Director as a full member. 
- NASA has made commendable progress in rationalizing the allocation of 
responsibilities among the five Centers most heavily involved in the 
Space Station Program. Nevertheless, provision for integration and 
test, and component flows among Centers remain too complex. The 
Committee recommends that this matter be addressed in the management 
study recommended below. 
Even these actions may not be sufficient to ensure that the Space Station 
Program can be properly managed in NASA. The Committee thus recommends that 
NASA establish a dedicated Space Station project organization that would 
subordinate all NASA personnel assigned to the Space Station development 
program to the Program Director and give the Program Director control of 
financial and other resources assigned to the Program. This authority would 
extend into the Centers, placing Center personnel assigned to the Space Station 
Program under the line authority of the Space Station Program Director. 
The Committee recognizes that such arrangements would depart significantly 
from current "matrix" management practices in the Centers. However, the 
Committee believes that the importance, size, complexity, and duration of the 
Space Station Program fully justify such new arrangements. 
SPACE STATION OPERATIONS MANAGEMENT 
As pointed out elsewhere in this report, planning has not gone far enough to 
permit a confident estimate of Space Station operating costs. Moreover, the 
Committee is not satisfied that operational considerations will be given 
sufficient priority. An organizational entity, independent of the Space 
Station Program development hierarchy, with the ultimate responsibility for 
operating the Space Station, should be formed promptly.(') (NASA appears to 
(1)  This entity would not obviate the need for operational expertise within the 
Space Station Program Office. 
be taking steps in this direction.) This entity should be located at a Center 
where much of NASA's operational expertise resides. One of the entity's 
important roles during development should be to promote those characteristics 
in the Space Station that will make it economical and practical to operate. 
This entity should not have veto power over decisions of the Space Station 
Program Director, but it should be sufficiently independent that it can create 
constructive tension between itself and the Space Station Program Office to 
assure that its views are taken into account. 
NASA should simplify the structure now envisioned for relations between the 
Space Station operators and the users. The Space Station will be a tightly 
constrained facility with more demands on it than can be satisfied. In such an 
environment, the burden should be placed on the user communities, insofar as 
possible, to set priorities and allocate the capabilities of the Station, 
consistent with national priorities and objectives. 
COOWDHNATYNG THE SPACE TRANSPORTATION 
AND SPACE STATION PROGRAMS 
As this report underlines, space transportation is of crucial importance to 
the Space Station: the deployment of the Station will require a large fraction 
of the Shuttle's capacity, and other resource tradeoffs between the Station, 
the Shuttle, and other launch systems will inevitably arise. Moreover, the 
Space Station cannot be developed, deployed, and operated without risk of 
significant setbacks, especially regarding the space transportation system. 
Although the Space Station Program has as an objective a "permanent manned 
capability," this capability will be permanent only to the extent that the 
supporting transportation system remains operational. In an important sense, 
the Station and its supporting transportation system comprise a larger system 
that arguably should be under a single manager. The Committee recognizes, that 
until problems in the Shuttle are corrected, such a consolidation would not be 
in the best interest of either the Shuttle or the Space Station. However, the 
Committee is not satisfied that the current liaison structure is adequate to 
deal with the critical issues at this interface. This issue should be 
addressed in the management study recommended below. 
FINANCIAL PLANNING FOR THE SPACE STATION PROGRAM 
As the Committee pointed out elsewhere in this report, the Space Station 
Program is extraordinarily complex, and unlike other space systems, the Space 
Station will become a facility that will be operated for decades. In some 
ways, it will be similar to the research base at Antarctica or to an 
oceanographic research vessel. It differs from these in that it will evolve 
and change, perhaps radically and in unanticipated directions, as it adapts to 
new uses. 
The Space Station is planned to be developed over a decade and subsegzzently 
managed over a 30-year period. Ideally, a realistic development budget should 
be determined and funds provided in a series of multiyear appropriations, 
thereby giving long-term financial predictability to the Space Station 
Program. NASA's obligation would be to manage the Program on a multiyear basis 
within this budget envelope. Eventually, the Space Station should not be 
defined as a project, but as an ongoing facility from which separately-funded 
research and other missions would be carried out; it should then be funded on a 
predictable long-term basis the way analogous facilities are. The Committee 
thus recommends that multiyear appropriations be provided to make financing of 
the Space Station more predictable. 
PREPARING A MANAGEMENT PLAN FOR 
REVIEW BY THE OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET 
Resolution of the management issues discussed above is of sufficient 
importance to the success of the Space Station Program that follow-up is 
justified. The Committee thus recommends that NASA, under the general 
supervision of the Office of Management and Budget, conduct a study analyzing 
this Committee's program management recommendations and concerns. This study 
should result in a plan expressing how and to what extent NASA intends to 
respond to the Committee's management concerns. The Office of Management and 
Budget should evaluate NASA's progress in implementing this plan approximately 
nine months after its submission. 
A P P E N D I X E S  

APPENDIX 1 
STATEMENT OF TASK 
The purpose of the Committee on Space Station (COSS) is to advise the 
Executive Office of the President and the National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration (NASA) on the design and development of an orbiting space 
station. The Committee is to review space station development in light of 
national space priorities, the functions and performance required to meet those 
priorities, the phasing of specific capabilities and interaction with foreign 
nations. Where appropriate, alternatives to current proposals should be 
identified and addressed. 
The study will be divided into three phases. Phase 0 will be a learning and 
information gathering process. Phase 1 has two distinct components. The first 
is a critical review of: mission priorities currently assigned the space 
station; functional and performance requirements; the proposed phasing of 
specific capabilities; and the rationale for design choices. The second 
component is a critical assessment of NASA cost estimates. The COSS will 
neither form cost estimates of its own nor attempt to replicate NASA's cost 
estimates. Instead, it will: review methods used by NASA; identify key 
assumptions underlying the cost ca1cuIations; and assess the risk that some of 
these assumptions will not be realized and the implications for space station 
timing, performance, and cost. Where appropriate, alternative methods and 
assumptions will be suggested. Phase 1 is to be completed by June 30, 1987. 
Phase 2 concerns long-term requirements and alternatives. The COSS will: 
(a) Review longer-term space station requirements, emphasizing scientific 
goaIs, technology development missions, commercial uses, national 
security purposes, and space infrastructure requirements, to include 
transportation and communications. 
(b) Identify attractive alternatives to the configurations identified in 
Phase 0 and assess their evolutionary capabilities and capacity to meet 
the desiderata outlined in (a). 
(c) Based upon (b), assess the potential costs associated with these 
additional capabilities, or savings associated with reduced or 
postponed requirements, including considerations of changing program 
content and schedule. 
1 Pieceding page bian. 
(d) Review the projected arrangements for international participation in 
the space station project and suggest how alternative space station 
concepts could influence this. 
(e) Complete Phase 2 by September 1, 1987. 
The COSS will submit two reports to the Executive Office of the President 
(National Security Council, Office of Management and Budget, and Office of 
Science and Technology Policy) and to NASA. The first will be a letter report 
due June 30 and will include Phase 1 work. The second letter report will be 
due September 1 and will include Phase 2 work as well as any other observations 
the Committee believes to be relevant. 
In addition to the specific charge, the COSS should report any other 
observations and recommendations it believes would contribute to national space 
station development. 
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same of these elemats. mese uncertainties could substantially 
affect schedules and costs of the Space Station Prcgram. They will 
be treated mre cmpletely in the second phase of the study. 
The Camittee offers the following preliminary findings relating 
to the cost estimates for Space station: 
a. Cost estimates for the lmfbm amponents vary in quality 
from same that seem quite supportable to others are 
less so. Overall, the uncertainties associated with the 
hardwam cost estimates are &ara&eristic of those for 
other large aexospace system at the sam early stage of 
definition. This implies that the current cost estimates 
for same hardware capnents may be exceeded for reasons 
that cannot naw be foreseen. 
b. Software cost estimates depend on the unit costs of 
developing vkoume lines of codett and the amount of code 
that nust be develaped. The Conmnittee is camfortable with 
NASA's estimates of unit costs for developing code, but 
feels that the arncrunt of code that must be produced may have 
been underestimated. This uncertainty in software cost 
stems from the preliminary state of definition of Space 
Station information systems. 
c. Space Station is an extraordinarily large and camplex 
system. It cannot be fully integrated on the graund and 
must be transported into space and assembled on orbit in 29 
packages--18 packages for Block I and 11 packages for Block 
11. The size and weight of these packages is limited by the 
payload volume and lift capacity of Shuttle. These 
limitations increase the on-orbit assembly and checkout 
required, much of which nust be done by astronauts during 
extra-vehicular activity. The management of Space Station 
integration is made more difficult by the q l e x  interfaces 
m n g  the four NASA Centers doing the bulk of the work on 
Space Station, and especially those between Johnson and 
Marshall. The integration challenge presented by this 
canbination of factors is unprecedented. 
Technical problems with systems integration are unlikely to 
be discmered until relatively late in the develalpnent cycle 
when they are costly to rectify. Schedule slippages 
resulting from delays associated with these fixes can 
themselves be a saurce of additional cost. NASA's most 
recent and relevant experience is with the Shuttle; however, 
Space Station integration is different fram and more complex 
than Shuttle integration. Thus, the experience with systems 
integration of the Shuttle is not likely to be a reliable 
guide to integration of Space Station. The Camittee 
believes that systems integration is a principal source of 
uncertainty in current cost and schedule estimates. 
d. NASA% $16.0 billion oost e s t h b e  for W pha,crd approach 
ineludes $3.8 billion for prq~m-wide contingemy 
r e s e s .  These are arm&ly rstain& a t  the 
Space Station pmgrax office level; no -e.s am 
controlled by the Centers. The C m d t t e  believes mt the 
Centers w i l l  n e d  major portions of thee resemes in ord- 
to have reasonable confidence that their obligations can be 
fwlfi l ld.  --wide m s e s  to insure agahst serious 
unexpcbd pmbleirs h one or rare of the mrk packages may, 
t h e f o r e ,  be W f i c i a t .  
e. Fmds for sane capnents unique t o  Space Station are not 
included in the $16.0 billion estimate. They have been 
inmqorated in the esthtes sham in T a b l e  1. These 
cmpnmts arz the f l i a t  tderdxtic semiax, an ozbital 
lm.?lewa~ vehicle am3 -g €!Erg- resal@ vehicles. 
Fur;ds for the miax are cwm i n  N P s A v s  
but furpds for the othertwo elamts are not. fm@f 
f. The estimates of Space Station casts cxlskmrily used, for 
example the $16.0 billion figure cite3 elsewhere in t h i s  
aport, cwa only the costs of services, hardware and 
softFrare for Space Station pmchasd f m  contractors--that 
is, such things as develcpmt anii production of Space 
Station flight hamhaze, ground support and test e q u i m t ,  
sofhare, and the i n L m t i o n  of Space station systems. 
These are the costs of Space Station that wauld be camied 
in the Research anA Development accaunt of NASA's budget. 
(1) D e v e l c p t t  of the o h i t a l  maneuvering vehicle is funded in the Space 
Tmmprtation Prc;gra and pmcuzmnt of one u n i t  is planned for the 
Shuttle. A second w i l l  be needed for Space Station to m m g e  
satellites arid payloads in close pmximity t o  the Station; the second 
unit is not in NASA's financial plan. 
(2) Crew =qency m s e  vehicles are not new part of the Space Station 
Fmgmn. current plans are t o  use '9safe havenw "quffi in Space 
Station (backed rqs by rescue w i t h  the Shuttle) t o  deal w i ~  
eneqmcies. MASA is now considering OK not emergency 
rescue vehicles w i l l  be needed and is defining the requbmmts they 
must satisfy i f  they are deaed necessary. The C a a i t - L e  believes 
that such vehicles w i l l  be &ed to deal w i t h  the full Large of 
contkgencies that could m. 
(3) The statanent that furads for the semi- are aver& in NAsAfs 
financial plan &auld be mdmtcod to man that they rn CCN- b 
t h u e ~ t t h a t s u c h a o s t s f a l l i n t h e y e a r s ~ ~ ~ t P l i s  
plan. This r i g  should be attached to similar stabrents elsewhere 
in this K e p & .  
A number of other costs for services and support required by Space 
Station are not included in the Space Station Reseamh and 
Development account. These include costs for such things as launch 
services, salaries of NASA personnel working on Space Station, 
spares and other operational costs, and the construction of Space 
Station facilities. 
Table 2 shuws a more cmprehensive estimate of Space Station costs, 
including these elemmts. The additional costs shuwn in Table 2, 
except for bertking modifications to the Shuttle, are all pruvided 
for in NASA's financial plan and should not be construed as 
additions to this plan. H m e r ,  this more cmprehensive estimate 
of Space Station Program costs is useful for u n d e r s m  the full 
mmume cummitment to Space Station and for planning and 
mnagement purposes. 
g. The Cantnittee has not yet addressed the operational costs of Space 
Station, but it is clear that operating the Station will be a 
demaxtbg and expensive urdertakhg. This urderlines the 
importance of making those initial investments necessary to insure 
that Space Station can be operated economically. 
The Camittee in its review of Space Station costs has identified 
three related issues that could &tially affect costs and pxugram 
success. In addition to camp1eth-q other tasks remainhq in the Space 
Station study, the Camittee intends to inquire M e r  into these 
matters. 
a. Limitations on Shuttle Payload and Demands on Shuttle Launch 
Cawcity. The limitations on Shuttle payload prwent the launch of 
fully assembled Space Station modules, camp1icath-q on-orbit 
assembly of Space Station. Moreover, weight grcrwth in Space 
Station cmponents during devel-t--a phencnnenon m n  to m t  
aeroqace systems--could exacerbate this situation. Finally, 
current plans for Space Station crew rotation would require about 
two thirds of all available Shuttle launches. (The Shuttle could, 
of course, carry additional payload to and from Space Statim on 
these crew rotation flights. ) Heavy lift launch vehicles, 
impruvements to Shuttle to increase its payload, and longer Space 
Station crew stay times would alleviate the effects of these 
limitations. NASA is currently investigating these matters 
intensively and the Cantnittee also plans to include them in its 
consideration. 
b. Backw Fliqht Harltware. NASA is planning little backup flight 
hardtware for major cmpnents of the Space Station. This policy 
promises to reduce program cost but runs the risk that the loss of 
key cmponents of hardware could delay the Space Station Program 
substantially. The Cantnittee intends to study alternatives to 
NASA's current policy that reduce these program risks in a 
cost-effective manner. 
NSA's Cmaizatim b Manage Ssam Statia. Ac gn- a t  
earlier in this r q o l t ,  Space Statim is unusually ocap1er ard 
u r z e  m t i m  &allengs. mese m 
qlicaM huthnr by the payload limitations of Shttle.  
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Space Station Research and Development Cost Estimates (2) 
(Billions of 1984 Dollars) 
Phases Approach (3) $12.2 $3.8 $16.0 
Flight Telerobotic Senricer .3 0.0 -3 (4) 
Orbital Maneuvering Vehicle 0.0 .1 .I (5) 
Crew Emrqency Rescue Vehicles 1.5 0.0 1.5 (6) 
Total Resear& and Developmmt $14.0 $3.9 $17.9 (7) 
(1) All estimates in this table are NASA estimates. 
(2) The estimates in this table include funds for Space Station that are 
in (or would be added to) NASA's Resear& and Developmnt account. 
This account pays for hardware and services purchased f m  contractors 
by NASA, e.g., for the dwelopmmt and production of Space Station 
flight hardware, graund supprt and test @pent, software, and the 
integration of Space Station systems. The Space Station R&D account 
does not m e r  other costs such as construction of Space Station 
facilities, launch services, salaries of NASA personnel working on the 
Space Station Program, and aperational costs. 
(3) The phased approach would deploy Space Station in two blocks. Block 
I, the flRwised Baselinettl inNASA terminology, would have 75 
kilmtts of photovoltaic pmer and would exclude dual keels. The 
addition of Blcck I1 would produce the lWhnced Configuration.I1 This 
configuration would add dual keels and 50 kilclwatts more of solar 
dynamic p e r .  
(4)  These funds are in NASA's financial plan. 
(5) Procurement of one unit for Space Station; development M are in 
the Space Transportation Program. Funk for the Space Station unit 
are not in NASA's financial plan. 
(6) Development and p-t of two vehicles; funds are not in NASA's 
financial plan. Source of this estimate is testhny of the Director, 
Space Station Program Office, before the House Submmittee on Space 
Science and Applications, April 8, 1987. He stressed that this 
estimate is highly uncertain because of the early state of crew 
emeryency rescue vehicle definition. 
(7) In addition to these costs, NASA has planned lltransition definition" 
studies--early conceptual studies of Space Station evolutionary 
possibilities--in the amount of $.2 billion, during the dwelopent 
and deplayment of Space Station. 
EstinaaW Total Cbsts to W e l a p  ard Deploy Space Station 
( B i l l i o n s  of 1984 Dol l a r s )  
Total ~~ and Welapment $14.0 $3.9 $17.9 
( f r m  Table 1) 
~ ~ t s  Essential to Space 
Station Carri 
N A S b m -  %POther 
Opratims Prior to 
Fual operatianal 
Capability 
WASA 335- (Direct & 2.2 . 3  
m4) 2.5 
Relate3 Facilities .2 0.0 .2 
Shuttle IWk for Spce station .1 0.0 .1 
Esth- To'& Space Station $21.0 $6.5 $27.5 
program- 
(1) All estimates in this table are NPSA esthtes. No operating msts after 
full operational capability are hc1uded in these estimates. 
(2) The elexents of mst listfd belw are COV& in other NPSA accounts, 
except for roodificatiow to the shuttle t o  permit it to berth a t  Space 
Station: Shuttle rrcdification msts w i l l  wentually appear in the Space 
Tmnqor'Lation Exqmn,  not in Space Station estimates. 
(3) E s t b a t @ s  reflect prices charge3 t o  DoD for Shuttle launches. This is 
the best available appmximtion of the price of shuttle launch services, 
and thus of the opportunity msts associated with Space Station uses of 
the Shuttle. 
APPENDIX 3 
CHRONOLOGY OF MEETINGS 
The Committee and its various subgroups convened in excess of 25 meetings 
between inception of the study in May 1987 and its completion at the end of 
August 1987. Major meetings are listed below: 
May 4-5: Full Committee Meeting, Washington, D.C. 
May 12: Meeting at Goddard Space Flight Center, Greenbelt, Maryland 
May 22: Meeting at Johnson Space Center, Houston, Texas 
May 26: Meeting at Marshall Space Flight Center, Huntsville, Alabama 
May 28: Meeting at Lewis Research Center, Cleveland, Ohio 
May 29: Subcommittee on Defense and International Affairs, 
Washington, D.C. 
June 1-2: Full Committee Meeting, Langley Research Center, Hampton, 
Virginia 
June 6: Subcommittee on Program Alternatives, Washington, D.C. 
June 6: Subcommittee on Transportation Issues, Washington, D.C. 
June 7: Subcommittee on Program Management, Washington, D.C. 
June 18: Review Group of Outstanding Issues, Washington, D.C. 
June 22-23: Full Committee Meeting, Washington, D.C. 
July 8: Subgroup Review of Harwood Configuration, Los Angeles, 
California 
July 10: Subcommittee on Transportation Issues, Washington, D.C. 
July 14-15: Full Committee Meeting, Washington, D.C. 
July 20-24: Task Force on NASA Cost Model, Huntsville, Alabama 
July 23-24: Subcommittee on User Requirements, Los Angeles, 
California 
August 3-4: Full Committee Meeting, Washington, D.C. 
August 18: Staff Meeting with Life Sciences Strategic Planning Study 
Committee, Boston, Massachusetts 
August 25-26: Full Committee Meeting, Washington, D.C. 
MEETINGS .WITH INTERNATIONAL PARTNERS 
June 5: Meeting between Dr. Friedman and the Director General of the 
European Space Agency, Paris, France 
August 13: Meeting with the Japanese Science Counselor and Japanese 
Space Station Negotiating Team, Washington, D.C. 
August 13: Meeting with the Canadian Science Counselor, 
Washington, D.C. 
August 14: Meeting with the Canadian Negotiating Team, 
Washington, D.C. 
August 14: Meeting with Washington ESA Representative and ESA 
Technical Representative, Washington, D.C. 
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